Official Liability and Its Less Legalistic Alternatives by Olson, Mancur




Legend has it that once when Kant was out for a walk and deeply preoc-
cupied with a complex philosophical problem, a passerby asked him the time
of day. Instead of giving the expected sort of answer, Kant, in his reverie, is
said to have launched into a lengthy abstract discussion of time, perception,
and language.' Most of us probably have friends or acquaintances (especially
in academic life) who similarly respond to a specific issue, problem, or ques-
tion with very general principles, philosophies, or prejudices rather than with
points that have direct relevance to the specifics of the case. This happens to
be particularly mischievous, in my experience, when intense ideological pas-
sions are brought to bear on complex and specific public-policy issues: the
ideologue who avoids specifics may take a position that a careful analysis of
the matter would show was inconsistent with his own values. Thus we should
be wary of dealing with a specific and complex problem by invoking princi-
ples of great generality.
Yet that is what I am going to do here. The reason why I want to deal
with the issue of civil liability for government officials in a very general con-
text is that it cannot, in my judgment, be properly understood unless this is
done. A physicist who studies how fast lead balls accelerate as they are re-
leased in water would surely be conscious that the relevant principles cannot
be properly understood or illustrated without some attention to how objects of
various sorts behave when released in the air, in a vacuum, and so on. Simi-
larly, we should not place any confidence in a major policy recommendation
unless it rests on experience in a wide variety of settings or jurisdictions, or is
at least supported by a theory that has proved useful in several countries and
periods.
* This article is a commentary on Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights
and Official Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Winter 1978, at 8. It was originally presented,
in a slightly different form, at the Liberty Fund, Inc., Seminar on Civil Liability and Government
Officials, administered by the Law and Economics Center of the University of Miami School of
Law (April 15-17, 1977).-Ed. I thank my colleague Neil Singer for his helpful criticism, though
he is of course not responsible for any shortcomings of this article.-Author.
t Professor of Economics, University of Maryland at College Park.
1. This is the sort of story of which it is said that if it isn't true, it should be. I have only a
secondary source for it, but an erudite and careful one: Professor William Parker of Yale.
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We must therefore ask how the suggestion that government officials
should have no immunity against civil liability relates to the functions and
characteristics of governments in general, or at least to our theory of gov-
ernment. I may seem to be putting forth a methodological requirement that is
inapplicable to the law or utopian. After all, the common law of any indepen-
dent jurisdiction must be a function of, among other things, the particular
disputes that happened to arise, the choices that judges happened to make,
and other developments that are peculiar to that jurisdiction. Similarly, what
the courts ought to decide in new cases should surely depend on the statutes,
which are usually unique to each country and historical period. These consid-
erations seem to suggest that our subject is wholly encompassed by the set of
institutions we are considering-that theories applicable to other societies
could have no bearing on what this country should do now.
In fact, we not only can but must transcend the particular American court
decisions in our analysis of the question whether government officials should
bear civil liability. The issue would not have arisen in the first place if some
people had not thought their interests or the interests of their clients or the
interest of society, or the people, as they conceived it would be served by
limiting or eliminating official immunity. An institution should surely be as-
sessed by its capacity to serve the interests of some individuals or groups,
however difficult it may be to aggregate the interests of the individuals or
groups in a jurisdiction. When we start this assessment with human needs or
interests, it immediately becomes clear that we can eliminate problems in the
given legal system by seeking alternative ways of meeting the needs that sys-
tem serves; there may be a way of meeting those needs that doesn't involve
the legal system in any significant or troublesome way. For example, the solu-
tion to the problem of finding an objective judicial standard for what pornog-
raphy is may be to repeal the laws against it; the way to prevent public offi-
cials from being negligent or malicious in dealing with applications for certain
licenses may be to open up the restricted activity to anyone who posts a bond
sufficient to compensate victims of malpractice. Similarly, if people in one
jurisdiction or historical period have an aspiration or interest, the odds are
that it has existed in other places and periods too; so we may be able to learn
a lot from a general theory of the processes through which those aspirations
and interests can be served. Useful as Jerry Mashaw's account of American
court decisions is, 2 we cannot tell how best to deal with official neglect or
misconduct until we have seen the recent U.S. legal history in a broader con-
text.
2. Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officials: Property Rights and Official Accountability, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB., Winter 1978, at 8, 14-22.
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I
The problem at issue in this symposium, and the one that Jerry Mashaw
has written about, is misbehavior or neglect by officials, not misbehavior or
neglect by governments. In one sense this is a meaningless distinction, since
the government has no existence apart from the actual or prospective acts of
its officials. Still, there is another sense in which this distinction must be em-
phasized and reemphasized, because the remedies for misbehavior or neglect
by governments and by officials are vastly different. We cannot prevent gov-
ernmental mischief or neglect by dealing only with the mischief or neglect of
officials; the government can change the laws-and with enough time and
support, the constitution-so that officials who do wrong or neglect wrongs
are only doing their legal duties. Indeed, if the government is wrong, official
misconduct or neglect may be a remedy. Obviously, we must not jump from
observing wrongs that individuals may suffer from the actions or inactions of
the government's agents to the erroneous conclusion that abolishing official
immunity will necessarily help. In any civilized society under the rule of law, a
government official should not be punished for following the law: the law
itself may be the cause of the action or inaction that we believe to be unjust,
immoral, in violation of human rights, or responsible for egregious ineffi-
ciency.
Mashaw explicitly makes the distinction between the shortcomings of offi-
cials and those of governments at several points. He says, "the real culprit
may indeed be sovereign, not official, immunity,' 3 and related assertions ap-
pear in several different places. Even so, they do not appear often enough or
in quite the right way. On occasion the implications of the distinction are
obscured, as when he tells of cases where "the failure to hold the government
or its officials liable seems strange."4 Nonetheless, Mashaw reasonably enough
does not deal with sovereign immunity or with other arrangements that de-
termine whether and to what extent the government compensates those whom
it damages.
It would take us far afield to analyze these matters here. However, when
the government makes decisions about compensation for many matters-such
as special aid for school districts next to federal installations or for those who
are hurt when floodwaters cross government levees or when redundant mil-
itary bases are closed-it frequently seems to many of us to overcompensate
the losers. It might be argued, for example, that federal projects for regions
subject to flooding, and the compensation paid to the victims of the flooding
that occurs when the flood-control ineasures are insufficient, encourage more
people to live in the flood plains, thereby increasing the total social losses
3. Id. at 27.
4. Id. at 14.
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from floods. As a general principle, any generous compensation of those who
lose because of government action will encourage individuals to put them-
selves in positions where they are likely to be eligible for the generous com-
pensation. Thus, though it may be true that official immunity and other ar-
rangements make the U.S. government on balance deficient in compensating
those whom it injures, the deficiency of compensation can by no means be
taken for granted.
II
If the three foregoing conclusions-or even the first two-are correct, it
follows that Mashaw's paper and this symposium are in essence about how to
make bureaucrats do better work and how to provide the compensation that
should be given to the victims of inadequacy in their work. The elimination or
limitation of official immunity may sometimes combat the laziness, incompe-
tence, prejudice, or inefficiency of government employees; it may also com-
pensate those who are harmed by these inadequacies. There are no other
major purposes for which official liability could possibly be the optimal in-
strument. Accordingly, the abolition or restriction of official immunity should
be compared with alternative arrangements, including those outside of the
courts, that can improve the performance of government employees or pro-
vide appropriate relief to those who are harmed by poor official performance.
The merit of this formulation of the problem can be seen by making the
counterfactual but instructive assumption that a government had perfect in-
formation about what each of its servants did or didn't do. Under this as-
sumption, all we would need to do to solve the problems that official liability
is supposed to solve is to insure that any individuals or groups who are
harmed by the government or its officials could receive the appropriate re-
dress from the relevant government department rather than from its em-
ployees. If the harm were an undesirable but inevitable by-product of the car-
rying out of a duly passed law, and no official had erred, there could still be
relief for the injured individuals; official liability, by contrast, could in no way
provide relief in such cases. If, on the other hand, an individual or group
were injured by errors of commission or omission by an official, there would
still be no need to restrict official immunity. Since, by assumption, we have
worked out arrangements which allow the injured to be compensated appro-
priately by the offending department, and have stipulated that the govern-
ment has knowledge of every sparrow's fall in the bureaucracy, we can con-
clude that each department has both the incentive and the capability to induce
each official to behave appropriately.
In this artificial context it becomes obvious that letting the courts punish
bureaucrats who err on the job would be like putting two captains in charge
of the same ship: it would give the head of a department nominal responsibil-
ity for what goes on but leave the discipline of his subordinates partly up to
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the judge. To be sure, the assumption of perfect knowledge by superiors of
their subordinates is wildly unrealistic, and that gives some of the implications
we have drawn from it a disturbing ring. It doesn't follow from the fact that
limitation of official immunity would be pointless under this assumption that
it would be pointless in the real world. All that our argument from perfect
bureaucratic knowledge has shown is that the elimination or limitation of offi-
cial immunity is worth considering only because of the imperfections of other
mechanisms for guiding the behavior of subordinates in a bureaucracy; if
these other mechanisms were perfect, there would be no point in limiting
official immunity. This is perhaps a narrow point, but it enables us to probe
down to the very taproot of the case against official immunity.
III
If the elimination or restriction of official immunity is not the proper
method of serving any significant social purpose in a world in which the head
of a department has perfect information about the actions and opportunities
of all subordinates, then we must look to the difficulties of getting informa-
tion about subordinates in a bureaucracy as the soil in which the case for
official liability might grow. The difficulty in getting information about the
performance of subordinates in typical government bureaucracies has not
been properly understood, in this writer's opinion, because a basic theory of
the matter has only lately begun to be developed. There are serious, special
problems in getting information about the effectiveness of most government
agencies, their employees, and their procedures, and these special problems
follow ineluctably from the character of the social purposes for which gov-
ernments are needed.
It would take much more space than is available here to demonstrate fully
why there are special difficulties in getting information on the performance of
government officials and agencies. The explanation of the special difficulties,
moreover, has been and is being set out elsewhere, for those who are in-
terested in a complete analysis of the matter.5 Thus only a brief, intuitive, and
impressionistic version of the argument will be set out here. It is not possible
to follow my argument, however, without first understanding a couple of
well-established ideas from my discipline, economics. Since those who
specialize in other fields, such as the law, would normally have no occasion to
come upon these ideas, I shall try to explain them briefly below.
Government action is necessary only to achieve those social purposes that
have the character of public goods. A good is public if it meets either of the
following sufficient but not necessary conditions:
5. See Olson, Evaluating Performance in the Public Sector in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH, THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 355 (M. Moss ed. 1973);
See also OLSON, BEYOND THE MEASURING ROD OF MONEY (forthcoming).
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1. If the good is available to one member of a group, it is available to the
others, or at least cannot economically be denied them.
2. If provided to one member of a group, the good can be provided to
others at no extra cost, or at least at an extra cost that is below the aver-
age cost of all the units provided. In the language of economics, the mar-
ginal cost of the good is less than its average cost at the socially optimal
level of provision.
When the first sufficient condition obtains and the group is sufficiently
large, the good will not be supplied adequately, if at all, through voluntary or
market behavior. Since supplying the public good to one member is tan-
tamount to supplying it to the entire group, and since the group is, by stipula-
tion, very large, a typical individual will get only a minuscule share of the total
benefit from any unit of the public good he purchases, though he will pay the
full cost of that unit. The fact that any amount of the good that is provided
goes automatically to everyone in the group also means that each individual
will get the benefit of any amount that has been provided by others, whether
or not he has paid for any of the public good himself. This in turn means
that the purchase of a unit of the public good by one individual will not give
others an incentive to follow suit; rather it will partially satisfy their needs for
the good. An individual may make his contribution contingent upon the con-
tributions of others or bargain in other ways with other members of the
group; but if the group is sufficiently large, a pair of individuals will not get
enough benefit from combined action to justify even the relatively small costs
of bargaining with each other, and more costly multilateral bargains will also
be uneconomic. The only condition under which there is a high probability
that an individual will voluntarily provide a public good is if the value of a
unit of the good to him alone is so great that it exceeds the total cost of
providing the unit to the whole group. Obviously, even if an individual pro-
vides some of the good on this ground, he will cease to provide it as soon as
the cost of additional units is no longer outweighed by the benefit that he
alone would derive from them-long before a socially efficient level of provi-
sion has been reached. A socially efficient level would be attained only if pro-
vision did not cease as long as the cost of additional units were outweighed by
their aggregate benefit to all who would receive them. In the language of my
trade, the socially optimal level of provision is attained only when marginal
social cost (the cost of an additional unit) equals marginal social benefit (the
aggregate benefit of an additional unit). Nothing close to this level will be
provided unless compulsory payments, such as taxes, are used to obtain the
resources for public goods. Thus law enforcement, defense, and pollution
abatement, all of which satisfy our first sufficient condition, are normally pro-
vided only by governments, which have the power to levy taxes.6
6. This argument is explained more precisely in OLSON, THE LOGIC oF COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1965).
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When the second sufficient condition obtains, markets will again fail to
provide a socially efficient amount of a good. Social efficiency would, as we
have seen, require that level of output at which marginal social cost equals
marginal social benefit. In the absence of other problems, the value of an ad-
ditional unit of a good will be measured by the price people pay for it. This
holds even if the price is zero, since individuals have an incentive to continue
using free goods until the marginal unit adds nothing to satisfaction. When the
second sufficient condition applies, the price or average revenue at the so-
cially optimal level of production must be less than the average cost, so that
a business operating at this level of production must lose money. There is ac-
cordingly a reason to consider public subsidy or provision of goods that meet
the second condition, in order to absorb the losses incurred by the producer
at the socially optimal level of production.
Roads and bridges that do not suffer congestion are classic examples of
goods that meet the second condition and are therefore financed out of' tax
revenues and provided to users free of charge. If the owner of a bridge
charged each driver only what it cost to let that driver cross-i.e., practically
nothing-he would never recoup the enormous expense of building the
bridge. In order to recoup that expense, the bridge owner will have to divide
it equally among all the toll-payers-i.e., set his price equal to his average cost.
At this higher price, drivers will cease to purchase additional crossings long
before the additional cost of those crossings-which is practically nothing-
ceases to be outweighed by their additional benefit. Hence the socially optimal
level of provision will not be reached.
Of course, governments sometimes intervene when no public goods are at
issue, as when they nationalize firms or industries that are not significantly
different from others in the private sector. However, government intervention
in the production of public goods is far more common. When government
intervention takes place in the absence of public goods, moreover, there is
presumably no need to handle civil liability any differently from the way it is
handled for private corporations. The government can provide that a public
corporation can sue and be sued in much the same way as a private corpora-
tion, and can give the officers of a nationalized firm the same powers over
their subordinates as officers of private firms have. Something like this ap-
pears to have been done in some nationalized industries in Europe.
IV
We are now in a position to tackle the question how a government can get
information about the productivity or effectiveness of the resources it is using
to produce public goods. That is, we can ask how a government gets informa-
tion about the "social production function," i.e., the quantitative specification
of the relation between the inputs and the output of a public or collective
good. Since these relations, like any causal relations, can be determined only
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empirically, the government agency must either use controlled experiments to
determine these relations or rely on a statistical analysis of the "natural exper-
iments" that occur because of variations over time and space.
The cost of experiments and the informativeness of actual experience are,
however, vastly different for private and public goods. The relationships be-
tween, say, the amount of fertilizer applied to a field and its yield of peanuts
can be determined with reasonable accuracy by applying different amounts to
perhaps less than a hundred tiny plots. The total cost of the experiment may
be negligible in relation to the total value of the information gained, since the
results of the experiment on the tiny plots are applicable to an entire indus-
try. The total cost of the experiments divided by the total value of the infor-
mation 7 will normally yield a small fraction for private goods and may even
approach zero. Even if there are no controlled experiments, the fact that
each peanut farmer or, indeed, each field offers an additional empirical ob-
servation will make actual experience relatively informative.
Now let's ask how we estir' ate the production function of a good that
meets the first of the two sufficient conditions for public goods. Since, by
definition, the units produced for one member of a group go to everyone in
the group, every experiment with such a good must involve the entire group.
If the French government of the 1930's wonders whether to rely mainly on
tanks and planes or a Maginot line for its defense, it is asking an empirical
question. The only way to get definite information on this question is to try
each of the proposed alternatives- to have at least one war using each of the
strategies. Such experiments are costly indeed. For public goods meeting the
first sufficient condition the cost of an experiment is equal to the cost of
providing the good for one period, since-by definition-an experiment on a
scale smaller than the size of the group which receives the good automatically
if any of its members receives it is itself impossible, or at least uneconomic.
Over time and across countries there are some variations that amount to
natural experiments; but since each group or country offers only one observa-
tion per period, historical and geographical variation is much less informative
about these goods than about private goods.
Goods that meet only the second sufficient condition for public goods are
characterized by much the same costliness of information. Once such a public
good has been provided to one individual, the cost of providing it to others is,
by definition, zero, or at least below the average cost. This can only be be-
cause there are huge fixed costs that must be met before even one unit can be
produced. An example would be a bridge in an area so sparsely settled that it
would never be congested. If even one person is to cross the bridge, it must
be built; but then others can cross it at no cost to society. An experiment on
7. This includes the discounted present value of the use of the information over several fu-
ture years.
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how bridge availability affects traffic patterns is costly because it requires the
experimenters to spend almost as much as it would cost to build a nonex-
perimental bridge. This costliness also reduces the number of observations
that historical or cross-sectional research can give us.
The greater cost of experiments to determine the production functions of
public goods and the lesser informativeness of experience with these goods
mean that the production functions of public goods are systematically less well
known than those of private goods. Since, typically, less is known about how
much of a public good could be produced with a given amount of resources
used at maximum efficiency than is known in the case of private goods, less is
generally known about how well a government agency is performing its mis-
sion than about how well a business is doing its job. We don't know what is
par for the course so we don't know whether a given score is a good or a bad
one. Indeed, in the case of public goods that satisfy the first sufficient condi-
tion (as the most basic and important public goods do), we don't even know
what the score, or quantity of output is, much less what output should be
expected. The very indivisibility that makes a public good go to everyone in a
group in essence makes it unquantifiable. Thus, we usually don't know how
much output an agency has produced, or if we knew, whether that level of
output would reflect efficient management of the resources. Given these diffi-
culties, it is no wonder that there are so many complaints about inefficiency in
both civil and military branches of government, here as well as abroad: the
information needed for efficient management is not available. It is also no
wonder that ideology plays such a large role in views about government, since
ideology thrives where definite knowledge is lacking.
V
Whether an institution produces a divisible, private good or an indivisible,
collective good affects not only our information about its overall performance
and that of its manager but also its own internal processes. The more accurate
the information about the output of an institution, the greater the ability to
estimate the usefulness of its component parts. If changes in the dependent
variable (i.e., output) are not known, there is not even a hope of estimating
the contribution that each independent variable (i.e., each input) has made. But
in a firm producing private goods the output, at least, is known, and there is
then often the possibility of roughly apportioning the responsibility for it
among the different parts of the firm. That is not only because of the rough
inferences that may sometimes be drawn from time-series data or experiments
but also (and more importantly) because the contribution of each part of a
firm can often be measured directly. The multiproduct or geographically dis-
persed firm can often set up what the accountant calls profit centers to facili-
tate evaluation of subordinate divisions and managers. If the firm's output is
at all homogeneous, it can simply count the units or components produced or
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handled by each factory or work group and relate the totals to the resources
that were used. Indeed, it is often possible to tell which nut tighteners have
tightened the most nuts and to pay them accordingly, that is, to use a piece-
rate or commission system. The fact that a piece-rate reward system is often
used by firms providing private goods but usually cannot be used (except at
early stages of production) by institutions providing collective goods is entirely
consistent with the argument that is being made here, and suggests that the
argument can have profound implications for the procedures and incentives
within an institution.
The lack of readily countable outputs in jurisdictions or agencies that pro-
duce collective goods, and the resulting lack of objective bases for judging
performance, have led to complicated, cumbersome, and expensive restric-
tions on public management. Civil-service or merit systems, requirements for
competitive bidding even when bidding is evidently uneconomical, separate
resource constraints for personnel, money, and certain classes of supplies, and
red tape in general are the natural concomitants of immeasurable outputs and
unknown production functions. Presumably, no one would care very much
whether the police commissioner gave a good job to his nephew or bought
uniforms from his brother if the police department were demonstrably as ef-
ficient as it could be. But since we don't know whether the police department
is giving good value, we know that the commissioner could get away with
hiring his nephew, however incompetent, or buying his brother's uniforms,
however costly, if we didn't outlaw it directly; so we do. Civil service rules,
competitive purchase provisions, and red tape no doubt prevent some of the
chicanery that the lack of knowledge of actual and potential output allows;
since such regulations limit the extent to which resources can be diverted
from public purposes, they may even increase output at times. But they also
impose enormous costs. In some cases the labyrinth of restrictions that limit
the freedom of action of public administrators is so elaborate that it prevents
timely action and creates a tendency to rely on contracts with outside
suppliers (sometimes nonprofit firms) to get the job done. This can be only a
temporary solution, since the lack of information allows inefficiency and cor-
ruption on the part of the contractors and thereby leads to regulations that
hem them in as well.
The fact that it is the lack of an adequately measured output, rather than
any other factor, that mainly accounts for the cumbersome regulations charac-
teristic of government bureaucracy is also demonstrated by the tendency of
nationalized industries producing private goods to have fewer regulations (at
least in some countries) than civil service department providing collective
goods.8 This in turn illustrates a point that must be emphasized: it is not
8. To the extent that the bureaucratic ethos has imposed some civil-service-like regulations
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governments that are inherently inefficient but rather the provision of collec-
tive goods and the handling of externalities, whether by governments or other
institutions.
The difficulty of weeding out the inefficient and rewarding the efficient in
institutions providing collective goods creates some problems that tend to
grow worse. The criteria for promotion cannot include productivity when the
volume and value of output are not known. Managers may have some intui-
tive impressions about output, but these are likely to be so hazy and contradic-
tory that other considerations must in large part determine who rises in the
organization. These other considerations may be very diverse. Whatever they
are, talented people will be more likely to rise than stupid ones, since they
will be able to find out sooner what has to be done to get promoted, and will
be able to do it better. One consideration that apparently affects promotion in
organizations producing collective goods is loyalty to the organization, its
leadership, its ideology, and its established way of doing things. Bureaucrats
with such loyalty will not rock the boat. In military organizations, police
forces, fire departments, foreign ministries, and churches, at least, it often
seems to be the consummate organization man who rises to the top. Such
men, however able, tend to be conservative in the sense that they are con-
vinced that the organization's hierarchy and practices are sound. Where it is
not productivity but able and unwavering adherence to the established policy
that leads to promotion, an organization is likely to depart further from ideal
allocations as time goes on; the more conditions change, the farther its initial
policies will be from the ideal.
VI
We can now bring together the conclusions of the different parts of the
argument. We saw earlier that if heads of governments had perfect informa-
tion about their subordinates' actions and options, there would be no point in
limiting official immunity: the purposes of official liability could be achieved
far better by letting the government itself compensate those whom it injures
and determine the rewards and penalties for those whom it employs. Any
other arrangement would weaken the chain of command. We then went on to
show not only that there is imperfect imformation about what the government
and its employees do but also that this information is systematically far worse
than our information about private goods, because of the inherent charac-
teristics of public goods. Even the special characteristics of civil-service merit
systems, competitive bidding rules, and red tape derive from the informa-
tional disparity that has been described.
and personnel policies on nationalized industries, they should be less efficient on average than
private enterprises.
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What has been said does not provide a basis for a decision about whether
or how official immunity should be limited, but it does provide a better
framework for debating the issue. It is already clear that proposals to limit
official immunity are intellectually admissable, since the government's knowl-
edge of its employees' behavior and opportunities is so poor. There is no basis
whatever for the assumption that if we could somehow put the right incen-
tives or instructions before the government as a whole, we would prevent the
negligence, malice, or ineptness of government officials.
So any plausible proposal, such as the limitation of official immunity, for
improving the incentives facing individual public employees deserves an early
listing on the political agenda. Moreover, civil service rules already limit
supervisors' control of subordinates (e.g., by making it very difficult to fire
them), as a way of keeping supervisors from political favoritism or the other
forms of misappropriation they could otherwise get away with in the dark
continent of the bureaucracy. We may therefore have little or no objection to
intrusion by the courts. The courts are, relatively speaking at least, nonparti-
san and often even disinterested. We may want them to pry into the bureau-
cracy on occasion and to discipline those they believe to be at fault. The
aggrieved individuals who bring action can be regarded as socially costless
inspectors who bring us information that we need about the shortcomings of
bureaucrats simply as a byproduct of their efforts to protect their own rights.
Clearly there is a case for some types of official liability.
But our framework also shows that the elimination of official immunity
cannot solve the problem of the inadequacy of bureaucracies and indeed can-
not even touch the largest part of that problem. To determine whether a
government official is doing his job adequately a court would have to know
not only what he has accomplished (which usually can't be found out) but also
what he could have achieved (which can only be discovered once the pro-
duction function is known). The courts have no magic way of estimating pro-
duction functions; indeed, their largely nonquantitative methods for getting
evidence are probably especially ill-suited to the estimation of production
functions. To consider an especially simple and typical case, suppose we al-
lowed a citizen who has been robbed to sue the police chief or the cop on the
beat, on the ground that they are not providing the protection they should
provide. We know that the best policemen cannot prevent all crime, and we
can usually take it for granted that civil service regulations will insure that the
policemen are not using the police budget to buy booze or hire relatives.
Thus, there is usually no way to assess such a complaint without making a
quantitative estimate of what the police have achieved in reducing the crime
rate and then comparing this with what could have been achieved with an
optimal allocation of the police budget. The very idea of a trial in which this
is attempted strains the imagination.
There is also the point that courts consider only the rights of the individu-
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als who come before them, whereas government officials affect the interests of
individuals as well as their rights. My interests are best served if the Chief of
Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces is as smart as Clausewitz, because I will then
be more relaxed and feel more secure from foreign invaders. But I don't
have a right to such a Chief of Staff that I can regularly protect in the courts,
in the way I have a right to make speeches critical of General Brown or a
right to trial by a jury if a prosecutor wants to incarcerate me for various
offenses. Since many of the shortcomings of government officials affect the
interests of citizens rather than any specific or well-defined rights, it is dif-
ficult to see how the courts would deal very well with them.9
Then, finally, there is the familiar point that our country uses the courts
far too much anyway, and shouldn't burden them with yet another set of
tasks. For good reasons or bad, we do not put a price on the use of the courts
or even on appeals of the decisions of lower courts. I am told by friends in
the law that when a case is appealed by a defendant, the appeal can normally
result in a reversal of the earlier decision but not in a heavier penalty if the
initial decision is upheld. When appeals cost the defendant so much less than
they cost society, they are probably overused. Any economist would predict
that the result of free access to the courts, and of the policy that almost any
type of grievance can be taken to the courts, would be overloaded dockets,
ridiculously long queues, excessive plea bargaining, and an ever-increasing
number of lawyers. Thus the proponents of limitations on official immunity
must show how the courts would handle the extra burden and how much it
would cost in money, in delays, and in the neglect of other types of cases.
They will not, I suspect, find the answers to these questions reassuring.
9. See George Stigler's humorous article on the problems that would be caused by allowing
students who were hurt by untruthful teaching to sue for damages. Stigler, A Sketch of the History
of Truth in Teaching, 81 J. POLITICAL ECON. 491 (1973).
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